Για να καταλάβουμε καλύτερα τί έχει συμβεί τα τελευταία χρόνια στην Ελλάδα ας προσέξουμε τί έγραφε η έκθεση του Ιουνίου του 2010 της Moody's για τους λόγους της υποβάθμισης από επενδυτικό επίπεδο Α3 σε σκουπίδι Βa1...Από αυτή συνάγεται ότι τα μεγάλα λάθη γίνανε από τις κυβερνήσεις μέχρι το 2013, οι οποίες δεν εφάρμοσαν όλες τις απαραίτητες διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις που όφειλαν σύμφωνα με το 1ο μνημόνιο με αποτέλεσμα να μην μπουν τα δημοσιονομικά στοιχεία της χώρας σε τάξη στην ώρα τους...
On 14 June 2010, we announced a downgrade of Greece’s sovereign bond rating to Ba1 from A3. The rating action concluded a review of Greece’s rating that we started on 22 April 2010. Our outlook on Greece’s rating is stable, reflecting our view that there is a substantial probability that it will not be changed over the next 18 months, and if it were to change, the risks are fairly balanced over whether the next rating action would be positive or negative.
As further outlined below, the magnitude of today’s rating adjustment was informed by our view on the country’s medium-term credit fundamentals. These, in turn, are driven by (i) the dramatic and profound policy changes dictated by the Eurozone/IMF programme announced in early May, (ii) our analysis of the implementation and macroeconomic uncertainties associated with the programme, and (iii) our view on Greece’s medium-term debt levels in a range of scenarios.
1. The Eurozone/IMF package assures sufficient access to funding thus effectively eliminating the risk of a purely liquidity-driven default over the next few years. Moreover, Greece has no incentive to default over the next two years whilst running a primary deficit because a default would require that the fiscal gap be closed immediately, rather than gradually over time as currently planned. Greece’s Ba1 rating is, therefore, determined almost exclusively by the risk that its debt trajectory might prove unsustainable over a multi-year horizon.
2. In our base-case scenario, which we believe will very likely be realised, Greece will implement effectively the policy changes it needs in order to stabilise its debt-to-GDP ratio at around 150% by 2013, and it will reduce its debt burden gradually thereafter.
3. Moreover, we believe that debt stability may be achieved even earlier than 2013 if the macroeconomic environment responds positively to the competitiveness-enhancing structural reforms that the government has pledged – and has already begun – to undertake.
4. Nevertheless, we believe that the risk of default (through either a failure to meet debt service obligations in a timely fashion or a distressed debt exchange) is, albeit low, inconsistent with an investment-grade rating. In particular – once the primary deficit is closed – if the macroeconomic environment substantially underperforms expectations and the debt-to-GDP ratio rises substantially above 150% Greece would be faced with a difficult policy decision. The government would need to consider if the burden of servicing such a large debt and implementing policy measures that go beyond those currently outlined under the Eurozone/IMF programme would outweigh the undoubtedly very substantial consequences of restructuring the debt.
The Eurozone/IMF package shelters Greece from the financial markets while it implements an ambitious fiscal austerity and structural reform programme. The pledge of official support may help Greece regain access directly to the market more rapidly than expected; however, if this is not achieved, the country’s short-term financing needs can easily be met by the EUR110 billion Eurozone/IMF support package. Moreover, the ECB can lend against Greek debt as collateral, and it can now also purchase Greek debt directly.
Greece not only has the means to avoid a near-term default, but it also has a very strong incentive to avoid a default. Its primary balance stood at -8.6% of GDP in 2009 and we forecast that it will remain in deficit through 2011. Under the Eurozone/IMF plan, the primary balance will only register a small surplus in 2012. If Greece were to default or restructure before then, it would certainly be unable to access the market and would need to achieve a zero primary balance immediately.
The Eurozone/IMF programme is built on reasonable and conservative assumptions about the growth in revenues achieved through tax increases, expenditure reductions that will result from programme cuts, and macroeconomic results influenced by tight fiscal policy and structural reforms. Given that the politically most controversial fiscal reform plans are “front-loaded”, the current plan has the advantage of positioning Greece well for sustained primary balance improvement (i.e. surpluses) once the initial zero primary balance is achieved.
This plan projects that the debt-to-GDP ratio will peak at nearly 150% in 2013 and interest burden of the debt will peak at about 20% of general government revenues in 2014. Thereafter, both debt burden measures are expected to decline over time. Barring any unexpectedly adverse macroeconomic developments, the government has very strong incentives to pursue the fiscal measures and structural reforms required to achieve these results.
The debt trajectory is extremely sensitive to the growth of GDP and tax receipts. Over the first five months of the year, ordinary budget expenditures fell by 10.6% year-on-year, as compared to the 4.8% reduction that is envisioned in the Stability and Growth Programme. The government has also been enacting its ambitious legislative agenda as agreed in the Stability and Growth Programme and the Eurozone/IMF package. There is some possibility that debt stabilisation could occur even sooner than projected, particularly if the badly needed structural reforms stimulate the development of untapped sources of economic growth. For example, the pace of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Greece has historically been delayed by unusually burdensome bureaucracy; however, the government has already unblocked stalled FDI projects totalling EUR2 billion in 2010 alone, and raise the possibility of billions more flowing into the economy by the end of 2011.
While it is likely that Greece will achieve debt stability, and in fact it may do so ahead of schedule, there remain significant implementation and economic risks to the program. The assignment of Ba1 rating indicates that medium-term risk of default is greater albeit still low. Over five-year investment horizons, Ba1-rated sovereigns, non-financial corporates and financial institutions have consistently met their debt service requirements on a timely basis about 93% of time and about 7% have defaulted. While these frequencies are generally indicative of expected future performance, realized frequencies of default by rating category have varied in the past varied – and will likely vary in the future – from this long-term average over time and across industries.
For example, according to the IMF’s analysis, if GDP growth were to be just a single percentage point lower than expected over the course of the plan period, the debt-to-GDP ratio (under the current fiscal consolidation plan) would rise to 166% by 2020. Many other risks are present: revenues may be weaker than expected; market interest rates (EURO LIBOR in the Eurozone/IMF programme) could be higher than anticipated; and inflation could be lower. While there is some cushion in the programme and the Greek government pledges it will do whatever is necessary to achieve the goals it has committed to in this programme, there are realistic limitations to any such commitment that imply that Greek government debt has, for now, some speculative elements which are inconsistent with an investment-grade rating.
In particular, we agree with the IMF’s statement in its executive summary of the Greek Stand-By Arrangement:
“Risks to the program are high. The adjustment needs are unprecedented and will take time, so fatigue could set in. Any unforeseen shock could weigh on the economy and the banking system even if the fiscal program is on track. Greece needs to persevere to ensure continued international support.”
As discussed above, the government’s term financing risks are very low and it has expedited the fiscal reforms as planned within the Eurozone/IMF programme. As a result, the key factors that will influence any subsequent rating action will be the performance of the Greek economy and growth or tax revenues. Information on these developments (whether positive or negative) will take some time to accumulate. The rating outlook is therefore stable.